Volume 23
Number 1

Article 4

10-15-2000

Till We Have Faces: From Idolatry to Revelation
Dominic Manganiello
University of Ottawa

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore
Part of the Children's and Young Adult Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Manganiello, Dominic (2000) "Till We Have Faces: From Idolatry to Revelation," Mythlore: A Journal of
J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature: Vol. 23: No. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore/vol23/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Mythopoeic Society at SWOSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mythlore: A Journal of
J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and
Mythopoeic Literature by an authorized editor of SWOSU
Digital Commons. An ADA compliant document is
available upon request. For more information, please
contact phillip.fitzsimmons@swosu.edu.

To join the Mythopoeic Society go to:
http://www.mythsoc.org/join.htm

Online Summer Seminar 2023
August 5-6, 2023: Fantasy Goes to Hell: Depictions of Hell in Modern Fantasy Texts
https://mythsoc.org/oms/oms-2023.htm

Till We Have Faces: From Idolatry to Revelation
Abstract
Examines the “face” image and theme in Lewis’s novel and relates it to the use of the same image in a
much broader literary context, from Augustine to Oscar Wilde.

Additional Keywords
Lewis, C.S. Till We Have Faces:—Themes

This article is available in Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic
Literature: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore/vol23/iss1/4

A Journal of J . R . R. Tolkien, C. S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature

Till We Have Faces:
From Idolatry to Revelation
Dom inic M anganiello
T E confrontation between a woman and her reflection in a mirror has
H
been a pervasive literary motif at least since Miltons Eve, who, in imitation
of Narcissus, bent over the still water and, for the first time, beheld “herself”
(Paradise Lost 4.456-76). Modern authors, such as Margaret Atwood, Margaret
Drabble, and Sylvia Plath, among others, have dealt extensively with the subject
(cf. Jenijoy La Belle). Recent criticism of their writings has in turn relied on
the theories of Freud, Lacan, or Foucault in an attempt to relate the “gaze” to
questions of sexuality, identity, power, and cultural constructions of gender.
Feminist critiques of Till We Have Faces have followed suit (cf. Bartlett). While
often helpful and incisive, such treatments tend to overlook the ethical and
theological dimensions of the “gaze.” However counter-intuitive it might seem
to apply Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Buber, and Franz Rosenzweig to an analysis
of C. S. Lewis as I propose to do, in fact they provide a striking illumination of
the central trope of the face in his fiction.
In Till We Have Faces, C. S. Lewis captures the whole life of an angry young
woman in a paradigmatic mirror scene. Orual, the protagonist, sees herself in
everyone and in everything: all belongs to her. This avaricious self-love breeds
contempt for others, especially the gods. No sooner has her rage reached its
peak, however, when a shocking moment of recognition shatters her self-image.
She is granted a vision of her father commanding her to dig and descend deeper
and deeper through a hole into a pillar room beneath the earth. There, in that
infernal setting, she stands before a mirror and re-enacts the same mise-en-scene
of her childhood, but this time with a telling difference. As a young girl she
experienced no meconnaisances, no distortions of the self, because the great
mirror” on the wall was one in which “you could see your perfect image.” Even
though the specular image reflected her facial ugliness, O rual merely
acknowledged the fact without weeping or turning her eyes away (69-70). The
second “epiphany of the face,” on the other hand, produces what Emmanuel
Levinas calls a “traumatism o f astonishment" (Totality and Infinity 73). Orual
discovers that she is Ungit, the goddess she loathes the most: “The vision . . .
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allowed no denial. W ithout question it was true. It was I who was Ungit. That
ruinous face was mine. I was that Batta-thing, that all-devouring, womb-like,
yet barren thing” (287).
Medusa-like, the face of the other petrifies the onlooker and fills her with
despair; moreover, it traumatizes the ego by rupturing its narcissistic unity.
Mesmerized by this eidetic image, Orual feels compelled to examine her past
life with a view to probing the causes of her self-disintegration.
Orual begins her confessional narrative on a defiant note. She wields a
vitriolic pen, accusing the gods of being cruel, vindictive, and— worse still—
mendacious (105). Not only have they placed intolerable burdens on Psyche,
she claims, but they also spread the vile lie that Orual hates her sister. Their
malice knows no bounds. The injustice of it all drives Orual to set the record
straight for posterity and leaves her wondering why the gods alter the past in
such a merciless manner (182).
Orual’s charges, however, recoil on her. Two episodes force a total revaluation
of her actions. The first occurs in a painful interview with Ansit, Bardias widow,
who tells her, “Your queenship drank up his [her husbands] blood year by year
and ate out his life. . . You’re full fed. Gorged with other men’s lives; women’s
too. Bardias; mine; the Fox’s; your sister’s; both your sisters” (274-75). W hat
seemed like love for her counsellor on the surface, Orual now realizes, was
actually hatred underneath (277). She treated all her loved ones with the same
selfishness and cruelty; her dealings with Psyche proved to be no exception.
The disturbing revelation comes to Orual while reading her own words of
protest against the bloodthirstiness of the gods: “Jealous of Psyche? Not while
she was mine. We want to be our own. I was my own and Psyche was mine and
no one else had any right to her . . . You stole her to make her happy . . . She
was mine. Mine . . . You’re blood-drinkers and man-eaters” (302-3).
On looking inside her text as in a mirror, she finds reflected there a verbal
icon of her all-consuming desire for mastery and possession of the other. By her
own account, Orual reduces the person to the status of an object, subjugates it,
and coerces it into carrying out her will. Her relationship with Psyche lacks
reciprocity and follows instead the m aster/slave dialectic o f H egel’s
phenomenology. Orual needs “the gaze of the other,” or the recognition of the
slave, to affirm her selfhood. How could the gods behave so unjustly towards
Psyche? In the very complaint lies the answer. The only injustice has been
committed by Orual herself.
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After gaining this unexpected yet crucial insight, Orual makes a gradual
about-face. At first her self-confrontation takes a negative turn. So repugnant is
the fact of being Ungit to her, for example, that Orual attempts suicide in the
river, but the unknown god stops her: “Do not do it . . . You cannot escape
Ungit by going to the deadlands, for she is there also. Die before you die.
There is no chance after” (291).
The oracle, though cryptic, offers a hopeful script that touches her soul
and opens her mind: “To say that I was Ungit meant that I was as ugly in soul
as she; greedy, blood-gorged. But if I practised true philosophy . . . I should
change my ugly soul into a fair one. And this, the gods helping me, I would
do. I would set about it at once” (292-93).
To transform her soul means, in Levinas’s terms, to take up “the facing
position,” that is, to bring the masterly ego to judgment “before the face” of
the other: “My orientation toward the Other . . . can lose the avidity proper to
the gaze only by turning it into generosity” ( Totality and Infinity 50). In response
to this moral summons Orual renounces her selfish attachment to Psyche: “Oh
Psyche, oh, goddess . . . Never again will I call you mine, but all there is of me
shall be yours. Alas, you know now what it’s worth. I never wished you well,
never had one selfless thought of you. I was a craver” (316-17).
Cupidity rendered her soul ugly; a renewed and purified love for Psyche
will make it beautiful.1 This reconciliation scene sets the stage for their final
encounter in the palace gardens where they find themselves side by side at the
very edge of a pool. When Orual casts down her eyes, she notices two figures,
two reflections: “Yes, both Psyches, both beautiful (if that mattered now) beyond
all imagining, yet not exactly the same” (319). The god now divulges the full
meaning of his utterance, “you also shall be Psyche” (182). Narcissus drowned
because of his need to see and possess only himself. Orual must “die” to that
false, idolatrous image of the self in order to see and possess the Other. Only by
transcending herself can she become frilly human and start a New Life.
Lewis reverses the tragic implications of the Narcissus myth. Like Dante’s
Beatrice, Psyche functions as the true mirror of the good by reflecting God’s
image without God actually becoming visible. Orual’s new name corresponds
to her new being reshaped by grace. The restoration of the “psyche or soul
rests, as Charles Ham pden-Turner translates M artin Buber’s idea, on “the
importance o f recognizing the uniqueness o f the other person, for in this
uniqueness we glimpse God in man” (124). Orual’s newly-found relationship
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to the internal “Other” as well as to other human beings dramatizes the catoptric
possibilites in human relations that Lewis described in another context as follows:
“The duty and happiness of every . . . being is placed in being derivative, in
reflecting like a mirror . . . O ur whole destiny seems to lie . . . in being as little
as possible ourselves, . . . in being clean mirrors with the image of a face not
ours” (“Christianity and Literature” 21-22).
Orual embraces this poignant truth in her mutual exchange o f self with
Psyche by the pool: “I was being unmade. I was no one . . . Psyche herself was,
in a manner, no one.” Her sister counts, not for her sake but for another’s
(318). In the end Orual revokes her infernal declaration of independence, “I
am my own,”2 and rejoices instead in the splendour o f her being made in the
image and likeness of her Maker.
The biblically-inspired notion of the derived self, as articulated by Lewis,
runs counter to most modern depictions of individuality. Ever since the “cogito”
of Descartes the primacy of self-consciousness has constituted “a modern article
of faith” (Ellmann and Feidelson 685). A first corollary of self-reference is to
display evidence of personal uniqueness like Rousseau does at the beginning of
his Confessions: he may be no better than other human beings, but at least he
is different.
From the celebration of the unique self in isolation to Nietzsche’s glorifcation
of the “healthy selfishness . . . that issues from a mighty soul, . . . around which
everything becomes a mirror” is but a small step (Zarathustm 208). The superman
has no genealogy because he struggles “to gain a past a posteriori from which
[he] might spring, as against that from which [he does] spring” (Use and Abuse
21), or to become his own origin. Along with the tendency to rewrite history
came a new principle fashioned from the old adage of Protagoras: the “creative,
willing, evaluating Ego . . . is the measure and value of things” (Zarathustra
60). The impulse of the Ego to set the standard of all experience3 culminated
in the aesthetic individualism of Oscar Wilde, who formulated his creed in a
letter of 1897 as follows: “The egoistic note is, of course, and always has been
to me, the primal and ultimate note of modern art, but to be an Egoist one must
have an Ego. It is not everyone who says ‘I, I’ who can enter the Kingdom of
Art” (Letters 289).4 By the turn of the century the secular scripture of modernism
could proclaim, in Irving Howe’s lapidary phrase, “a salvation by, of, and for
the self” (14).
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The most incisive critique o f the extravagant claims made in this third
testament came from none other than Wilde himself. The Picture o f Dorian
Gray stands as his parable o f the impossibility o f ever achieving beatitude on
aesthetic terms. The eponymous hero makes a demonic pact in the manner of
Faustus, exchanging his soul for eternal youth, but he sees himself as a modern
Narcissus too. In the portrait Basil Hallward paints of him, Dorian perceives
“the marvel of [his] own face” and the “magical mirror” o f “his own soul” (114,
106). The birth o f self-awareness witnessed here recapitulates Lacans theory of
the mirror stage (91-100). The initial encounter of the subject as child with its
idealized self-image in the m irror is essentially narcissistic since it wrongly
identifies the specular “Other” as the object o f desire. The Other is in feet the
Same. The split psyche that results from pondering this illusory difference
arises out of the subject’s inability to move out again into the real world and
turn its gaze on the true Other. For Wilde the egocentric predicament of his
young protagonist is as much spiritual as it is psychological: “W hat the worm
was to the corpse, his sins would be to the painted image on the canvas. They
would mar its beauty, and eat away its grace” (119). Sinning involves a turning
to the self to the exclusion o f the Other. Dorian adopts various guises in order
to multiply his personality and thereby hide the true “face of [his] soul” (157).
Later, on realizing that he is more than an object of pleasure and is indeed an
ethical being with a conscience, he rebels against the “unjust m irror” that
exposes his hypocritical transgressions committed while wearing the “masks” of
goodness and beauty (220, 222). The painter Basil Hallward had seen in
Dorian’s pristine good looks “perfection face to face,” a beatific vision o f his
friend’s personality "directly presented to [him] without mist or veil” (114).
The “idolatry of the beautiful,” as Levinas says (Otherwise than Being 199 n.21),
leads one to worship “a work o f art [that] substitutes itself for G od.” Basil
repents of his “curious artistic idolatry,” while Dorian persists in his folly (11,
158). The tragedy o f lost transcendence whose outcome is spiritual suicide
leaves Dorian “withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of visage” (224). W ilde’s
cautionary tale negates his own cherished maxim: the truths of metaphysics are
not the truths of masks.5
Lewis grounds his divine comedy on the ethics rather than on the aesthetics
of the face. Orual’s ostensible purpose in telling her story is to have the reader
judge favorably her version of events on account o f her Rousseauistic candor:
“in this book I must hide none of my shame or follies” (189).6 Lewis, however,
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attaches a great deal o f irony to her statement. The moment she makes a point
of not concealing anything, she decides to don a veil that covers the ugliness of
her face and, by extension, her soul. O n one level the veil, like Dorians mask,
emblematizes self-deceit. Despite her intense introspection, Orual, at this stage
of her development, lacks genuine self-knowledge. Once the veil is lifted, the
lace revealed is just as hideous as Dorians mirror image. The difference lies in
Orual’s willingness to mend her fragmented self, and to have it re-formed into
a prelapsarian imago Dei before meeting her Maker face to face. She begins as a
Rousseau, but ends as an Augustine.7
Levinas’s philosophy of the face, supplemented by Merleau-Ponty’s, helps
to illuminate important aspects of Lewis’s ethical poetics. As opposed to the
egocentric impulse of Individualism, the ethos o f Levinasian personalism is
altruistic. It conceives o f persons in relation who engage in “a primordial
donation” ( Totality and Infinity 174), that is, in making a gift of the self to the
other. W hat triggers this self-giving? Levinas claims it is one person’s sense of
wonder upon seeing another person’s face in its nudity and destitution.
The original sincerity of the face “resists possession,” invades the subject’s
solitude, and disturbs his self-interestedness to the point o f obliging him to
respond to its need and frailty (197-99):
There is first the very uprightness of the face, its upright exposure, without defense. The
skin o f the face is that which stays most naked, m ost destitute. It is the most naked, though
with a decent nudity. There is an essential poverty in the face; the proof o f this is that one tries
to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking a countenance. T he face is exposed,
menaced, as if inviting us to an act o f violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to
kill. {Ethics and Infinity 86)

The “epiphany of the face” can be construed, then, as an ethical phenomenon
{Totality and Infinity 199) since it moves each person to behave responsibly
towards his neighbour. The face of the other also acts as an existential mirror,
according to Merleau-Ponty’s complementary metaphor, in which the subject’s
face first appears to itself and develops its identity.8 In that facial mirror, “we
do not have two images side by side of someone and ourselves, but one sole
image in which we are both involved . . . each the reverse of the other” {The
Visible and the Invisible 83). Proximity makes neighbours interdependent,
enantiomorphic reflections of the same Being. Coexistence precedes yet initiates
the communal definition o f persons.
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For Lewis, too, the face reveals the person. Oruals identity crisis stems in
part from her refusal to acknowledge the moral appeal the face makes not to
commit murder when she drains the life-blood from Bardia and Psyche.9 Her
decision to wear a veil manifests a deeper anxiety about who she is. N ot
surprisingly, her veiled face poses quite an enigma, fuelling much speculation
among the citizens of Glome. Some say it is the face of a siren or an animal too
terrible to be apprehended directly, while others maintain it radiates a dazzling
beauty. The best story making the rounds is that Orual has no face at all. She
is, paradoxically, a faceless woman with a thousand faces (237, 281). All these
theories strike her as absurd, but they are closer to the truth than she imagines.
Even going “bareface” represents a last ditch effort on her part to wear a
“disguise” (289) and flaunt her anonymity.10 She is condemned to go without
a face until she strips away the myriad “facades” o f her ego, repents, and is
ready to offer her primordial donation to Psyche in the self-effacing, “reversible”
moment by the pool. The “brightface” o f Psyche (166) emerges in a new
perspective: it is no longer the goal of Orual s quest for happiness but the way
that leads her there. Just as Glomes citizens want to glimpse the true face of
their queen, so too Orual secretly pines to see the face of the god who gives her
sister so much joy. Although her supernal desire mirrors Psyches longing for
her patria (83-84), Orual glosses over this fact when she lectures her sister:
‘“We must face it, child . . . W hat sort of god would he be who dares not show
his face?’ . . . ‘Nothing that’s beautiful hides its face. Nothing that’s honest
hides its name’ . . . ‘In your heart you must see the truth’” (168).
The scene is replete with irony. Orual is, of course, the one who is blind to
the presence of the other and ignorant of her true identity. The veil she wove
from morally imperfect dispositions clouds her view. But the god consoles her
with these words: “You, woman, shall know yourself” (182). The potential for
having a personal relationship with the god had always existed. Orual becomes
a person by developing a face to meet the faces of other people and, ultimately,
the gods, for “how can they meet us face to face till we have faces?” (305).
Lewis’s re-presentation o f the face-to-face relationship, while rooted in the
ethical, transcends mere ethics. In this respect his philosophical orientation
shows more affinity with the personalistic tradition of Martin Buber and Franz
Rosenzweig than with that of Levinas.11Although Levinas affirms “the dimension
of the divine opens forth from the human face,” transcendence for him takes
place in this world alone and not in some beatific contemplation of the wholly
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other ( Totality and Infinity 78). The ethical relation between persons by itself
already constitutes a vision of God.12 Martin Buber, on the other hand, contends
that one cannot face an Other without being “transfigured in God’s countenance”
(82). The transfiguration of the human face leads inevitably to communion
with the divine: “When a man loves a woman so that her life is present in his
own, the You of her eyes allows him to gaze into a ray of the Eternal You”
(154). Psyche mediates the dialogue between the human “I” and the divine
“Thou” for Orual. As Lewis explains it, the soul’s vis-a-vis with God results in
mutual self-revelation: “By unveiling . . . we assume the high rank of persons
before Him. And He, descending, . . . reveals that in Him which is Person . . .
The Person in Him . . . meets those who can welcome or at least face it. He
speaks as ‘I’ when we truly call Him ‘Thou’” (Letters to Malcolm 33-34).
In this proximity whose alterity is absolute, the divine countenance “which
glances at me and out o f which I glance,” writes Rosenzweig, resembles the
human countenance not because God is “my mirror, but God’s truth.” “To
walk in the light of the divine countenance,” Rosenzweig concludes (423-24),
one must heed “the words of the divine mouth” or the scriptural injunction
(found in Micah 6.8) “to do justice and to love mercy.”
The quest for justice in Till We Have Faces contains intertextual echoes
from the Bible. Lewis links Orual momentarily with Job, who uses a familiar
trope to ask Yahweh an overwhelming question: “Why do you hide your face
and look on me as your enemy?” (Job 13.24). He wonders why Yahweh refuses
to speak to him, as he did in former times to Moses, “face to face, as a man
speaks with his friend” (Exod. 33.11). Orual’s array of questions are no less
pointed than those o f her biblical counterpart, her sense of enmity no less
keen. But she cannot face the god or see “the place where all the beauty came
from” (83), because from the outset she seeks revenge rather than friendship.
Her monologic “babble” (305) pre-empts any kind of dialogue with the other.
But “the face speaks,” Levinas points out; it is a voice that ushers in the very
advent of meaning (Totality and Infinity 66, 206). The manifestation of the face
elicits the primal word of exchange from Orual’s lips: “‘Lord, who are you?’
said I . . . ‘Lord, I am Ungit’” (291). “What is redemption,” Rosenzweig asks,
“other than that the I learns to say Thou to the He?” (274). Orual’s receptiveness
to the speech of the god allows him to correct her defective vision: “The voice
of the god had not changed in all those years, but I had. There was no rebel in
me now” (291). Through the medium of dreams the god shows Orual fulfilling
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a series o f burdensome tasks on Psyche’s behalf. O rual’s participation in her
sister’s sufferings not only foreshadows the great self-offering o f Christ for
humanity’s sake, it also presages her hope for divine mercy which goes beyond
what strict justice would demand. ‘“Are the gods not just?”’ she asks her mentor,
who replies, “‘O h no, child. W hat would become of us if they were?”’ (308).
Orual is truly just to Psyche when she loves her, and the reward o f justice,
according to the Psalmist (Ps. 17.15; cf. 26.8), consists in seeing the face of
God.
Till We Have Faces, like The Divine Comedy, then, provides a present gloss
on “another text,” a “shadowy preface” of what is to be disclosed in a futurity
that constitutes the ultimate meaning of the veil.13 Lewis follows Dante’s practice
of employing biblical tropes such as “face,” “veil,” and “mirror” to convey the
successive stages of O rual’s progress from spiritual darkness and unbelief to
“pale enlightenment” and the full “unveiling” or re-velation of the Truth himself.
The veil was literally a cover for the radiant face of Moses after he had been
speaking to Yahweh and figuratively the relationship between the letter of the
Old Testament and the spirit of the New, who is Christ (2 Cor. 3.12-16). The
“conversion” of Scripture by means of a retrospective illumination is analogous
to O rual’s re-vision of her autobiographical scroll in the light o f her own
conversion; “It would be better to re-write it from the beginning . . . The past
which I wrote down was not the past that I thought I had (all these years) been
remembering. I did not, even when I had finished the book, see clearly many
things that I see now” (263).
In her book of memory, as in Dante’s (cf. Freccero 122-23), “vision” is a
hermeneutic metaphor for the interpretive glance backward that restores the
eyes of the soul. “The god is both the ‘pagan’ Cupid and somehow a participant
in the Christian fabric of exchange and mercy,” Colin Manlove observes (273),
“working ‘backwards’ (if we may use such terms of acts in eternity) from Christ’s
life and death, in parallel with O rual’s own ‘working backwards’.” Cupid
prefigures the God of all ages who plays hide-and-seek through the features of
men’s faces. Orual sees him through a glass darkly (1 Cor. 13.12; cf. 2 Cor.
3.18) or, as Nicholas of Cusa renders the idea, “in all faces is seen the Face of
faces, veiled and in a riddle.”14 The veil is removed and the enigma solved once
Orual approaches the light that makes the “one Face above all worlds” visible
(Perelandra 244): “And he was coming. The most dreadful, the most beautiful,
the only dread and beauty there is, was coming” (Till We Have Faces 318-19).
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Here, as in Dante’s “marvellous vision” in the V ita Nuova, a Lord of terrifying
aspect, “frightening to behold, yet apparently marvellously filled with joy” (5),
is set to appear and overwhelm the beloved.15 This Love, for whose sake “the
earth and stars and sun . . . existed” (318),16 satisfies Orual’s deepest desire:
“Lord, . . . . You are yourself the answer. Before your face all questions die
away” (319). As the battle o f words ceases, her narrative is suspended abrupdy
in joyful anticipation of the One— the Author himself—who will come to read
it, unveil its meaning, and reveal Orual fully to herself The epiphany o f the
Face binds her to silence in an endless ending, for the soul finds peace only in
looking at her Lord.17
Endnotes
1T he com m entary o f St. Augustine on 1 John 4:19 provides an appropriate gloss on O rual’s
transformation:
How could we have loved him [God] if he had not first loved us? By loving him, we became his
friends; but he loved us when we were his enemies, in order to make us his friends. He loved us first
and gave us the boon o f loving him. W hat is a misshapen and deformed man doing, loving a beautiful
woman?. . . Can he, by loving, change and become beautiful?. . . O ur so u l. . . is ugly due to iniquity,
loving God makes it beautiful”.(193-94)

For Em m anuel Levinas, spiritual life is not the “inferiority o f the beautiful soul,” as Susan
H andelm an (294) points out, but “exteriority”, that is, “the opening to the other.” Lewis,
however, has O rual implicitly follow the Christian tradition o f trying to achieve a harm ony
between inferiority and exteriority. H e once described her as having a “naturally Christian
spirit” (“anima naturaliter Christiana”). See Letters27A.
2 Lewis uses George M acDonald’s statement, “T he one principle ofhell is — ’I am m y own’,” as
epigraph to the fourteenth chapter o f Surprised byJoy (212). O rual’s declaration recalls that of
Lilith, the eponymous heroine o f M acD onald’s novel that was first published in 1895,about
her daughter: “I am not another’s; I am m y own and m y daughter is m ine” (Lilith 199). The
metanoia, or change of heart, both heroines experience reflects the Pauline affirmation, “What?
k n o w y e n o t t h a t . .. ye are not your own? For ye are bought w ith a price” (1 Cor.19-20).
3 Apropos o f Nietzsche’s famous proposition, “If G od existed, how could I bear not to be
God?,” Franz Rosenzweig remarked, “T he first real human being among the philosophers was
also the first who beheld God face to face— even if it was only in order to deny him” (18). Even
before Nietzsche, however, the libertarian M ax Stimer, sometimes dubbed the German
Protagoras, had pushed the claims o f the ego to set the standard o f all experience still farther.
Drawing on Fichte’s declaration, “the ego is all,” Stimer stressed the uniqueness o f the finite as
opposed to the absolute ego: “To be a m an is n o t to realize the ideal of Man, b u t to present
oneself, the in d iv id u al. . . / am m y species, am w ithout norm , w ithout model and the like”
(182). The Egoist, the individualist review nam ed in honour o f Stimer, published some major
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work of the early modernists, including Joyce’s ^ Portrait oftheArtist and chapters o f Ulysses, as
well as the poetry o f Pound, H. D ., and the criticism ofT.S. Eliot. See Michael Levenson (70).
4Wilde alters the following words o f Christ: “N ot everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall
enter the kingdom o f heaven; but he who does the will o f my Father in heaven shall enter the
kingdom o f heaven” (M t 7.21).
5 In several essays Wilde extolled art for rejecting truths and faces in favour o f lies and masks. In
“T he Critic as Artist,” for example, one of his characters states, “M an is least himself when he
talks in his own person. Give him a mask and he will tell you the truth” (1045). A nd in “The
Truth of Masks,” he affirmed, “in art there is no such thing as a universal truth. A Truth in art
is that whose contradictory is also t r u e . . . T he truths o f metaphysics are the truths o f masks”
(1078). For the affinities between W ilde and Nietzsche on this subject see Thom as M ann’s
article.
6 Orual’s statement recalls the one Rousseau makes at the beginning o f his Confessions-. “So let
the numberless legion of my fellow men gather round me, and hear my confessions. Let them
groan at my depravities, and blush for m y misdeeds” (17).
7 In Tales ofLove, Julia Kristeva provides an extended commentary on the trope of the mirror in
literary theory as well as in cultural history. Relevant to my discussion here is her reference to
Augustine in describing the “mirrorlike” relationship o f the soul to God:
Consider this mirrorlike motion: my desire will be fulfilled through Him, for He has fulfilled his own
by creating me in his image . . . Let me recall a hardly orthodox but highly significant expression of
jubilatory identification of the lover with his God, in a prayer that has been attributed to Augustine:
“O lord, if I were God and you Augustine, I would rather that you be God and I Augustine.” (160)

Augustine’s supposedly heterodox notion needs to be located. It would seem that Kristeva
alludes to the following passage from St. Francis de Sales on the soul’s benevolence towards
God:
Ah, how dearly do I love the impossibility o f being able to desire any good for you, O my God, since
this comes from the incomprehensible immensity of your abundance . . . We are told that the great
St. Augustine often made such acts and poured forth in an excess of love these words: “Ah, Lord, I am
Augustine and you are God, but still if there were that which neither is nor can be, namely, that I were
God and you were Augustine, then I would wish to change my condition with you and to become
Augustine, so that you might be God!” {On the Love o f God 250).

St. Francis considered this spiritual practice of imagining impossibilities to express the soul’s
insatiable desire for God as profitable. St. Augustine’s prayer, moreover, must be placed in the
context of what he says in the Confessions (22): “I should be null and void and could not exist
at all, if you, my God, were not in me. O r is it rather that I should not exist, unless I existed in
you? Hot all thingsfind in you their origin, their impulse, the centre oftheir being (Rom. 11.36).”
Augustine makes a related statement later in his narrative: “W hen we learn to know God, we
become new men in the image of our Creator” (332). By having Orual acknowledge her true
origin, Lewis models the last part o f her narrative on Augustine’s Confessions rather than on
Rousseau’s.
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8 For connections between the philosophy o f the face in M erleau-Ponty and Emmanuel
Levinas see the article by John Patrick Burke.
9 For Levinas the com m andm ent “thou shalt not kill” does not mean simply “that you are not
to go around firing a gun all the time. It refers, rather, to the fact that, in the course o f your life,
in different ways you kill someone. For example, when we sit down at the table in the morning
and drink coffee, we kill an Ethopian [sic] who doesn’t have any coffee. It is in this sense the
com m andm ent m ust be understood” (Tamra Wright, “The Paradox o f Morality: an Interview
with Emmanuel Levinas” 173).
10 O ne o f the sources for Lewis’s use o f the trope of the face is a striking passage from George
M acDonald’s Lilith:
Did they [the apparitions] know how they appeared to others— a death with living eyes? Had they
used their faces, not for communication, not to utter thought and feeling, not to share existence with
their neighbours, but to appear what they wished to appear, and conceal what they were? And, having
made their faces masks, were they therefore deprived of these masks, and condemned to go without
faces until they repented? (86)

11 For the connections between Levinas and Buber see the article by James Ponet. For Levinas
and Rosenzweig see the article by Richard A. Cohen.
12 Levinas states, “the transcendence o f the face is not enacted outside o f the world, not a
beatific contemplation of the other...Transcendence is not a vision o f the other, but a primordial
donation” (Totality and Infinity 172, 174). Susan H andelm an quotes the following passage
from Levinas to corroborate this point: “Ethics is not the corollary o f the vision o f God, but that
vision itself’ (302). In a section titled “Divine Comedy” in his essay on “G od and Philosophy,”
Levinas comments that the word “transcendence” has to be “put back into the significance of
the whole plot o f the ethical or back into the divine comedy w ithout which it could not have
arisen. That comedy is enacted equivocally between temple and theatre, but in it the laughter
sticks to one’s throat when the neighbour approaches— that is, when his face, or his forsaken
ness, draws near” (179). John Patrick Burke elaborates on the point by saying that the dimen
sion o f the divine for Levinas is ultimately the dimension o f “justice which is there primarily in
the proximity to me o f m y neighbour in need and n o t through a direct manifestation o f the
personal G od” (205 n. 11). For Lewis, however, acting justly entails loving G od and loving
one’s neighbour for G od’s sake.
13 See Inf. XV.88-90; Par. XXX.78-81; Inf. XXXIII.27.
14 Cf. the description o f Yahweh in the book o f Proverbs as a master craftsman “at play
everywhere in his world, delighting to be with the sons o f men” (8.31). T he following verses
from “As kingfishers catch fire,” a poem by Hopkins, are also relevant:
For Christ plays in ten thousand places,
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
To the Father through the features of men’s faces. (90)

Nicholas o f Cusa, in his mystical treatise o f 1453, explains his idea as follows: “Lord, I compre
hend T hy face to precede every face that may be formed, and to be the pattern and true type
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of all faces, and all faces to be images ofThy face. .. Each face, then, that can look upon Thy
face beholdeth naught other or differing from itself, because it beholdeth its own true type”
(24).
15Lewis refers to the Vita Nuova in The Problem o fPain to make his point that “love is something
more stem and splendid than mere kindness... even the love between the sexes is, as in Dante,
‘a lord of terrible aspect’” (27-29). Orual progresses from seeing the “ruinous face” of Ungit to
seeing “the most dreadful, the most beautiful” face of the god of Love.
16The powerful closing scene in which Orual anticipates meeting the god of Love, for whose
sake “the earth and stars and sun . . . existed,” refers unmistakably to the climax of Dante’s
journey in Paradiso (XXXIII. 145) when he contemplates the Love that moves the sun and the
other stars.
17Cf. Dante, Par. XXX. 100-102. The Vita Nuova ends on a similar note: the prospect of seeing
the miraculous vision of the Trinity inspires Dante to remain silent.
Works Cited
Alighieri, Dante. The Divine Comedy.. Trans. Allen Mandelbaum. New York: Bantam, 198284.
—. Vita Nuova. Trans. Mark Musa. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992.
Augustine. Confessions. Trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.
—. In Epist. Ionn. ad Parthos 9, 9. The Navarre Bible: The Catholic Epistles. Trans. Michael
Adams. Dublin: Four Courts, 1992.193-94.
Bartlett, Sally A. “Humanistic Psychology in C. S. Lewis’s Till We Have Faces-. A Feminist
Critique.” Studies in the Literary Imagination XXII (Fall 1989): 185-98.
Buber, Martin, land Thou. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Scribner’s, 1970.
Burke, John Patrick. “The Ethical Significance of the Face.” Proceeding o ftheAmerican Catholic
PhilosophicalAssocation 56 (1982): 194-206.
Cohen, Richard A. “The Face of Truth in Rosenzweig, Levinas and Jewish Mysticism.”
Phenomenology o f the Truth Proper to Religion. Ed. Daniel Guerriere. Albany: SUNY Press,
1990. 175-201, 300-306.
De Sales, Francis, St. On the Love o f God. Vol. I. Trans. John K. Ryan. Garden City: Image,
1963.
Ellmann, Richard, and Charles Feidelson, Jr., eds. TheModem Tradition:Backgrounds ofModem
Literature. New York: Oxford UP, 1965.
Freccero, John. Dante: The Poetics o fConversion. Ed. Rachel Jacoff. Cambridge: Harvard UP,
1986.
Hampden-Turner, Charles. Maps o fthe Mind. New York: Macmillan, 1981.
Handelman, Susan A. Fragments o fRedemption:Jewish Thoughtand Literary Theory in Benjamin,
Scholem, and Levinas. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1991.
Hopkins, Gerard Manley. The Poems ofGerardManley Hopkins. Ed. W. H. Gardner and N. H.
MacKenzie. Oxford: OUP, 1970.
Howe, Irving, ed. Literary Modernism. Greenwich: Fawcett, 1967.

43

44

Issue 8 7

Volume 23.1

Mythlore:

Kristeva, Julia. Tales ofLove. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
La Belle, Jenijoy. HerselfBeheld: The Literature ofthe Looking Glass. Ithaca and London: Cornell
UP, 1988.
Lacan, Jacques. “Le stade du miroir comme form ateur de la fonction du je.” Ecrits. Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1966. 91-100.
Levenson, Michael. The Genealogy ofModernism:A Study ofEnglish Literary Doctrine. Cambridge:
CUP, 1984.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. Trans. Richard A.
Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1985.
— . “G od and Philosophy.” The Levinas Reader. Ed. Sean H and. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
166-189.
—. Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Trans. Aiphonso Lingis. T he Hague: M artinus
Nijhoff, 1981.
—. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Aiphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
UP, 1969.
Lewis, C. S. “Christianity and Literature.” Christian Reflections. Ed. Walter Hooper. Glasgow:
Collins, 1981. 15-26.
—. The GreatDivorce. Glasgow: Collins, 1979.
—. Letters ofC. S. Lewis. Ed. W. H . Lewis. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1966.
—. Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1964.
—. Perelandra. The Cosmic Trilogy. London: Pan, 1990.145-348.
—. The Problem ofPain. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940.
—. Surprised byJoy: The Shape o fMy Early Life. New York: Harcourt, 1984.
—. TillWe Have Faces:A Myth Retold. Glasgow: Collins, 1980.
MacDonald, George. Lilith. G rand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990.
Manlove, Colin. “‘Caught up in the Larger Pattern’: Images and Narrative Structures in C. S.
Lewis’s Fiction.” Wordand Story in C. S. Lewis. Ed. Peter J. Schakel and Charles A. Huttar.
Colum bia and London: U M issouri P, 1991. 256-76.
M ann,Thomas. “Wilde and Nietzsche.” OscarWilde:A Collection ofCriticalEssays. Ed. Richard
Ellmann. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1969. 169-71.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Visible and the Invisible. Trans. Aiphonso Lingis. Evanston:
Northwestern UP, 1968.
M ilton, John. Paradise Lost. Ed. M erritt Y. Hughes. New York: Odyssey P, 1962.
Nicholas o f Cusa. The Vision o f God. Trans. Evelyn Underhill. New York: Ungar, 1960.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra:A Everyone and No One. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
— . The UseandAbuse ofHistory. Trans. Adrian Collins. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957.
Ponet, James. “Faces: A M editation.” Orim:A JeivishJournalat Yale l (1985): 58-76.
Rosenzweig, Franz. The Star ofRedemption. Trans. William W. Hallo. New York: Holt-Rinehart,
1971.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Confessions. Trans. J. M. Cohen. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985.

A Journal o f J. R. R. Tolkien, C. S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature

Singleton, Charles S. The Divine Comedy: Paradiso II: Commentary. Princeton: Princeton UP,
1975.
Stirner, Max. The Ego and His Own. Trans. Steven T. Byington. New York: Dover, 1973.
Wilde, Oscar. “The Critic As Artist.” Complete Works o fOscar Wilde. London and Glasgow:
Collins, 1971. 1009-59.
—. The Picture o fDorian Gray. Ed. Isobel Murray. Oxford: OUP, 1981.
—. SelectedLetters ofOscar Wilde. Ed. Rupert-Hart Davis. Oxford: OUP, 1979.
—. “The Truth ofMasks.” CompleteWorksofOscarWilde. London and Glasgow: Collins, 1971.
1060-1078.
Wright, Tamra, et al. “The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas.” The
Provocation o fLevinas: Rethinking the Other. Ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood.
London and New York: Routledge, 1988.168-80.

45

